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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian man attempted to set off a bomb
on a Northwest Airlines flight.' The United States deemed this
Christmas Day attack as an act of terrorism. 2 Luckily, the bomb failed
* Jennifer LeVine is a graduate of Emory University and the University of Florida
Levin College of Law (May 2011). She has competed nationally as a Finalist with the Florida
Moot Court Team, and enjoys travel, baking, and the company of good friends.
1. Anahad O'Connor & Eric Schmitt, TerrorAttempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device
on Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/
26plane.html. A member of the Homeland Security Committee commented that the explosives
may have passed through security because they were a new substance that had not been used
before. Id.
2. Id.
175
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to detonate, and the plane landed safely. However, soon after, President
Obama and the Transportation Security Administration responded by
implementing Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), heightening
airport security measures. 3
The legal controversy over the scanners has revolved primarily over
issues of privacy. AIT reveals such personal information as breast
implants and prosthetics.4 Many critics argue that the new technology is
highly invasive, and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.5 Proponents contend that the technology is useful and
necessary, given the substantial dangers of terrorism and the importance
of airport security.

11. TECHNOLOGY BEHIND NEW X-RAY SCANNERS
Advanced Imaging Technology has existed since 2007 but was not
heavily used in airports until March 2010,6 in the form of a body
scanner, AIT uses x-ray technology to detect hidden objects and
3. The government has responded similarly in response to other airline bombers. In
December 2001, while aboard an international American Airlines flight, the "shoe bomber"
Richard Reid attempted to set off bombs from his shoes. In response, TSA regulations have
mandated that passengers remove their shoes prior to entering the scanners at security
checkpoints. TSA Travelers Assistant, available at http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/
assistant/index.shtm; see O'Connor & Schmitt, supranote 1. See also Eric Lipton, Possibility of
Plots Prompts More Checks for Explosives at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/us/15secure.html? r=1&fta=y.
4. Tobias W. Mock, The TSA's New X-Ray Vision: The FourthAmendment Implications
of "Body-Scan" Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
213, 246 (2009). See also Sandra Fish, My Left Breast Put Fancy TSA Scanner to the Test,
POLITICS DAILY, 2010, availableat http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/02/06/my-left-breast-putfancy-tsa-scanner-to-the-test/; Colleen Cappon, Implants, Piercings, Prosthetics, Oh My! What
You May Reveal to TSA Employees, Fox NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/11/19/implants-piercings-prosthetics-oh-reveal-tsa-emplo
yees/. Joe Sharkey, On the Road: Airport Screeners Could Get X-Rated X-Ray Views, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2005, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/ business/24road.html.
5. Julie Solomon, Does the TSA Have Stage Fright? Then Why Are They Picturing You
Naked?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 643, 655 (2008). "The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Legislative Council, Timothy D. Sparapani, testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation about the ACLU's concerns regarding these searches,
equating the technology to 'Superman's X-ray vision' which is 'capable of projecting a highresolution image of a passenger's naked body."' Id. (citing Principles for Evaluating Physical
Screening Technologies Consistent with Constitutional Norms: Hearing Regarding the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration's Physical Screening of Airline Passengers and Related
Cargo and Airport Screening Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
109th Cong. (2006)).
6. Transportation Security Administration, Advanced Imaging Technology, available at
Imaging
[hereinafter TSA Advanced
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/index.shtm
Technology].
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potential threats. Before any passenger may enter the airport departure
gates, they must submit to this scanner testing, as well as a physical patdown if the security officer deems it necessary. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) purchased 450 AIT units using funds
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, with the intention
of installing them at airports throughout the nation.7
AIT scanners are able to screen beneath passengers' clothing to
produce an image of their bodies, revealing both metallic and
nonmetallic items.8 TSA employees operate the scanners but do not
need to physically touch the passengers to reveal the image. In this
manner, the scanners are somewhat less intrusive than the secondary
physical pat-down screening. Without physical contact, the scanners
produce either a black and white three-dimensional image or a mirror
image of the body, depending on the technology used. 9
The two technologies used to scan passengers are called "Backscatter"
and "Millimeter Wave."' 0 These technologies have been reviewed for
safety standards by many national health organizations, such as the Food
and Drug Administration's (FDA) Center for Devices and Radiological
Health (CDRH), the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
(APL). 1 These various organizations found that the radiation emissions
are minimal. 12 Furthermore, TSA boasts that its Millimeter Wave
technology emits less radiation than one cell phone call. Additionally, one
scan through a Backscatter machine is equivalent to the exposure resulting
from flying on an airplane for two minutes.' 3 Nevertheless, some scientists
have questioned the risk of the X-ray radiation.'14
Millimeter wave machines use electromagnetic waves to produce a
three-dimensional black and white photograph of the passenger.

7.

AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, PL 111-5, Feb. 17, 2009,

123 Stat 115; TSA Advanced Imaging Technology, supra note 6.
8. TSA Advanced Imaging Technology, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Transportation Security Administration, Safety, available at http://www.tsa.gov/
approach/tech/ait/safety.shtm [hereinafter TSA Safety]; Mock, supra note 4, at 226-27.
11. TSA Safety, supra note 10.
12. Id.; Homeland Security Office of Health Affairs Fact Sheet: Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) Health and Safety, available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/ait fact sheet.
pdf; Food and Drug Administration, Products for Security Screening of People, available at
http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/Secu
ritySystems/ucm22720 1.htm#2.
13. TSA, Safety, supra note 10.
14. See Richard Knox, Scientists Question Safety ofNew Airport Scanners, NPR, May 17,
2010, availableat http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126833083.
15. TSA, Advanced Imaging Technology, How it Works, availableat http://www.tsa.gov/
approach/tech/ait/how itworks.shtm; id. Millimeter Wave Unit.

178

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W & POLICY

[Vol. 16

Backscatter Units use low level X-ray beams to display a reflection of
the passenger's body on the TSA monitor. 6 nce passengers place their
belongings on the security conveyor belt, they are prompted by a TSA
agent to step into the scanner. The passenger is asked to stand still in a
certain position while the machine takes the image. A remotely located
TSA agent views the image, which is subsequently affirmatively deleted
if no threats are present.1 7 If passengers refuse to participate in the
scanning, they will be subject to a "thorough pat down."' 8
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVACY

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 1 9 Furthermore, this right to be free from
unreasonable searches "shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." Probable cause is determined based on the
21
probability of the existence of criminal activity.
Katz v. United States marked a shift in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.22 In Katz, an individual was charged with violating a
federal statute when he conveyed wagering information by telephone.2 3

16. Id. Backscatter Unit.
17. Id. Officers see different images based on which machine is used. Id. Millimeter Wave
Detection, What Do Officers See?; id Backscatter X-Ray Technology, What Do Officers See?
18. Id. Millimeter Wave Detection; id. Backscatter X-Ray Technology; see also Gary
Stoller, Airport Screeners get more Aggressive with Pat-downs, USA TODAY TRAVEL, Nov. 2,
2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2010-10-29-tsa-pat-downsN.htm?
loc=interstitialskip.
19. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV.
20. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV.
21. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
23. Id. at 348.
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Two questions were presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States. First, "[w]hether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally
protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic
listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in
violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth." 24 Second,
"[w]hether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is
necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."25
The Court held that the acts of the government constituted a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as "[t]he
Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privac upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth. . . ." Ultimately, the Court found that
the Fourth Amendment not only prevents the search and seizure of
tangible items but also includes a broader concept of personal privacy.27

IV. EXCEPTIONS

TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

New Jersey v. T.L. 0. was a landmark Fourth Amendment case which
obviated the need for a warrant in "exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. . . ."28 In this
case, the Supreme Court found that a search of a student's purse for
cigarettes in a school environment did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.29 The Court stated that a less demanding standard than
probable cause could be applied in cases where there are "special
needs," such as the need for school authorities to ensure the safety of
other students. 30 Additionally, the Court reasoned that a warrant
requirement would prevent school officials from maintaining safety in
schools, b delaying their ability to respond quickly and effectively to
violations.
Since this landmark case, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence regarding warrantless searches has become more refined
and been applied in many different scenarios.
For example, in New York v. Burger, the Court created a three-part
24. Id. at 349.
25. Id. at 350.
26. Id. at 353. "The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not
happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance." Id. at 359.
27. Id. at 353. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 359.
28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
29. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 327-28.
30. Id. at 331 n.2.
31. Id. at 353.
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test to determine whether a warrantless inspection was reasonable. 32 A
warrantless inspection is reasonable so long as: (1) a substantial
government interest exists that relates to the regulatory scheme; (2)
warrantless inspections are necessary to further the scheme; and (3) the
statute authorizing the warrantless inspection is a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant.3 3 In Burger, the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless search of a junkyard's records, permits, and
vehicles. 34 "Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a
'closely regulated' industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the
warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government
search.... have lessened application. . . ."35
New York's interest in regulating the junkyard industry, based on
the state's specific concerns regarding motor vehicle theft, was a
"special need" satisfying the first prong of the test. 36 Furthermore,
regulation of the junkyard industry was proven an effective response to
the state's interest, necessary to further the scheme under the second
prong.37 Finally, the statute in question, § 415-a5, provided an adequate
substitute for a warrant, because it not only set forth the narrow scope of
the search, but it also notifies the operator of the search.38 Thus, § 415a5 fell within the scope of the administrative search exception to the
Fourth Amendment, and circumvented the warrant requirement. 39
Another Supreme Court case allowing warrantless searches is
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. 40 In Sitz, the
constitutionality of Michigan random sobriety checks was challenged. 4'
The Court balanced the importance of the State's interest in preventing
drunk driving, the extent to which the checkpoints advance that interest,
and the minimal degree of intrusion for the drivers.4 2 The Court stated
that the State's interest in protecting its residents from drunk drivers
was valid, as the state was experiencing very high numbers of drunk
driving deaths.43 In comparison, the extent of the invasion into
individual's privacy during these brief motor stops was minimal.4 4
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 712.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 712.
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 450.
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Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the warrantless searches
and held that the sobriety checkpoints were constitutionally
reasonable.4 5
V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment personal privacy protection was limited by
the Administrative Search Exception, which allows for searches which
46
further a federal interest as long as there is probable cause of danger.
"Where regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest and
possibilities of abuse and threat to privacy are not of impressive
dimensions, inspection of licensed business place may proceed without
warrant where specifically authorized by statute.
In other words,
searches carried out for security purposes, rather than to obtain criminal
evidence, are permitted.4 8
Importantly, the Supreme Court has found that consent is not
necessary for an administrative search to be constitutional.4 9 In United
States v. Biswell, the Court held that a warrantless search of a pawn
store owner's storage room was valid under a federal gun control
statute, the Gun Control Act of 1968.50 The Court stated, as applied to
"a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully
limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not
on consent but on the authority of a valid statute." 5 ' Thus, when a dealer
decides to engage in the business and pursues a federal license, he is
aware that these items will be subject to inspection. 52
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue of
preflight warrantless searches, airport searches have been referred to in
dicta as constitutionally reasonable administrative searches. 53 In United
45. Id.
46. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
47. Id.
48. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV; New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717, (1987). "So
long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that
the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created
by the scheme itself." Id.
49. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
50. Id. at 317.
51. Id. at 315.
52. Id. at 316.
53. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000);
Nat'1 Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 (1989). "Where the risk to
public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may
rank as 'reasonable'-for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings." Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323, (1997)).
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States v. Davis, an individual attempted to board an airplane with a
concealed loaded gun in his carry-on luggage. 54 The Davis Court found
that the search was part of the general regulatory scheme, furthering the
administrative purpose of airline safety and the government's antihijacking efforts. 5 5 Specifically, "[t]he essential purpose of the scheme
is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry
them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to board
at all."56 Furthermore, the Court detailed the importance of the
screenings due to the potential threats to passengers and their property,
as well as the urgency of the situation. 7 The Court held that the search
fell under the purview of the administrative search exception.5 8
In United States v. Aukai, an airport search occurred when a
passenger elected to walk through the magnetometer in the security area
of Honolulu International Airport, "thereby subjecting himself to the
airport screening process. "5 However, the Court highlighted the fact
that, "[a]lthough the constitutionality of airport screening searches is not
dependent on consent, the scope of such searches is not limitless." 60
Rather, "a particular airport security screening search is constitutionally
reasonable provided that it 'is no more extensive nor intensive than
necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of
weapons or explosives [][and] that it is confined in good faith to that
purpose. "61It is not necessary to obtain a passengers consent, but if
passen ers do not wish to undergo the screening, they may choose not
to fly.6
54. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 904 "It makes no difference that the act of opening appellant's briefcase was
accomplished by a "private" airline employee rather than a "public" official. The search was
part of the overall, nationwide anti-hijacking effort, and constituted "state action" for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
56. Id. at 908.
57. Id at 910. "The need to prevent airline hijacking is unquestionably grave and urgent.
The potential damage to person and property from such acts is enormous. The disruption of air
traffic is severe. There is serious risk of complications in our foreign relations." Id.
58. Id. at 908-10.
59. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007). "Under current TSA
regulations and procedures, that election occurs when a prospective passenger walks through the
magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the x-ray machine." Id. at 961.
60. Id. at 962.
61. Id. (quoting Davis,482 F.2d at 913).
62. "It is well to stress once again the essential point developed earlier in discussing the
administrative search theory of United States v. Davis: the less stringent Fourth Amendment
limitations applicable to airport screening procedures are justified by the need to prevent
hijackings, and thus there is no need to compel a person who elects not to board to submit to a
search." See WAYNE R. LAFAVE 5 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

§

10.6 (4th ed. 2010). But see United

States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005), where a qualification was placed upon the
option to elect not to board. The Davis option to elect not to board does not apply once the
passenger has placed his bag on the x-ray scanner. Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617. "The procedure is
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In these cases, "the reasonableness of such searches does not depend
in whole or in part, upon the consent of the passenger being searched."63
Furthermore, screenings have been held constitutional, particularly postSeptember 11, 2001, if they are "conducted as part of a general
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely,
to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and
thereby to prevent hijackings." 64 Therefore, as long as screenings
comply with § 44901 Screening Passengersand Property, consent of
the passenger is not required. When a passenger elects to enter the
security area in an airport, the passenger may be subject to search.6 6

VI. THE REASONABLENESS

TEST

Even if the Administrative Search exception applies, the warrantless
search must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 67 "The
determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific
class of searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails."' 68 This balancing test may be easily
swayed if an invasion is substantial.6 9
For example, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio stated that a
limited search of an individual may be substantial despite the
government interests involved.70 In Terry, the Court found that evidence
of a revolver was properly admitted into evidence after the police
conducted a search of an individual. 7 ' The Supreme Court found that
the government's interest in investigating crime and protecting officers
from armed suspects was a valid interest. 72 However, the Court stated
geared towards detection and deterrence of airborne terrorism, and its very randomness furthers
these goals." Id.
63. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 957.
64. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908; See also United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d.
Cir.), cert denied, 549 U.S. 945 (2006); Marquez, 410 F.3d at 616.
65. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44901 (2007).
66. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Biswell, 406 U.S. at
315 (1972)).
67. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). "Although the underlying command
of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable
depends on the context within which a search takes place." Id. See also Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
68. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of City
& County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
69. Id.(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967)). "The scope of the search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 18.
70. 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967).
7 1. Id. at 3 1.
72. Id. at 24.
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that the "nature and quality of the intrusion" must be balanced against
that interest when evaluating potential Fourth Amendment violations.7 3
Therefore, the Court looked closely at the officer's search, noting that
the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Terry was dangerous and
holding a weapon. 74 The Court also held the officer took due care in
searching only what was absolutely necessary to obviate the threat."
Another case illustrating this principle is Stafford United School
DistrictNo. 1 v. Redding, where a student was searched for drugs and
was required to expose her breasts and pelvic region. 76 The Supreme
Court of the United States found that this search was unreasonable,
because there was no indication that the drugs were of any danger to the
students.7 7 Furthermore, there was no indication that the student was
carrying drugs in her underwear.7 8 The search was not "justifiably
related to the circumstances" as required by New Jersey v. T.L. O.79
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States in Wyoming v.
Houghton stated that evaluation of search and seizure "under traditional
standards of reasonableness" should be assessed "on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."80 Thus, the extremity of the intrusion may be
81
considered when determining Fourth Amendment violations.
Yet, in United States v. Skipwith, the Fifth Circuit found that there
are certain dangerous scenarios that will always satisfy the
reasonableness test. 82
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of
a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so
long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of
73. Id. "Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe,
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 24-25.
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2635.
77. Id. at 2643.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (1985)). "The T.L.O. concern to limit a school
search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to
underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum
leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts." Id. Significantly, the
intrusiveness of the search elevates it to another level. "The meaning of such a search, and the
degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own
demanding its own specific suspicions." Id.
80. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
8 1. Id.
82. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
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preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the
passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search
so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.
In Skipwith, an airline passenger was convicted of cocaine
possession after being detained at airport security for weapons.8 4 The
Court concluded that the search was valid and expanded on the decision
in United States v. Moreno.8 5 While Moreno stated that the
reasonableness test could be applied on a "case-by-case application,"
Skipwith held that persons who "present themselves for boarding on an
air carrier, like those seeking entrance into the country, are subject to a
search based on mere or unsupported suspicion." 86 The Court stated that
once Skipwith presented himself for boarding, the Deputy U.S.
Marshall was justified in searching by any means to reveal objects that
the "passenger could reasonably have used to effect an act of air
piracy."87 The Deputy was not constitutionally limited to frisks or patdowns to reveal weapons.
VII. THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 2001

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 200189 was enacted
after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. It
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), intended to
"strengthen the security of the nation's transportation systems while
ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce." 90
Initially, the TSA was regulated by the Department of Transportation,
but in 2003 TSA was transferred to the Department of Homeland
83. Id. at 1272 (citing United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972)).
84. Id. at 1274.
85. Id. at 1276 (citing United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1276.
88. Id.
89. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West).
90. Transportation Security Administration, What is TSA?, available at http://www.tsa.
gov/whoweare/whatistsa.shtm. "Within a year, TSA assumed responsibility for security at
the nation's airports and deployed a Federal workforce to meet Congressional deadlines for
screening all commercial airline passengers and baggage." Id. Many of the new regulations put
into place were validated by the courts. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 73, 87 (2d
Cir. 2006); MacWade v. Kelley, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006). See M. Madison Taylor,
Bending Broken Rules: The FourthAmendment Implications of Full-Body Scanners in Preflight
Screening, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 6 (2010) (citing Ric Simmons, Searchingfor Terrorists.Why Public Safety is Not a Special Need, 69 DUKE L.J. 843, 850 (2010)); See generally United
States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Cyzewski,484 F.2d 509,
512 (5th Cir. 1973); Davis, 482 at 910 (1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182
(3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).
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Security. 9 1
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act also federalized
airport security screeners, assigned Federal Security Managers to each
airport and required all checked baggage to be screened for explosive
devices.92 Before this Act was in place, airline companies dealt directly
with airport security personnel. Although the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act gave broad power to the TSA to protect
passengers against aircraft violence, they are not empowered to regulate
criminal activity outside of the airport context. 93
VIII. IS THE NEw TSA TECHNOLOGY A VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT?
The new Millimeter Wave and Backscatter machines are different
from previous cases involving magnetometers. 94 The new machines not
only detect evidence of metal medical alterations to the individual's
body but also detect non-metal alterations as well.95 Moreover, there is
further concern for abuse of the images produced, as a remotely located
security officer must subjectively determine whether an item on an
individual's body is a threat. 96 The intrusiveness of the new technology
raises questions regarding the extent of search necessary for security
purposes.
According to United States v. Davis, warrantless searches are
permissible under the Administrative Search Exception when conducted
"to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and
thereby to prevent hijackings."9 When analyzing the Millimeter Wave
and Backscatter scans under the Burger, Davis, and Aukai tests for
administrative searches, the main concern is the extremity of the
invasion and the frequency of use.98 Under the new Backscatter and
Millimeter Wave technology, the privacy violation occurs when the
91. Transportation Security Administration, supranote 90.
92. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West).
93. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (p) (West).
94. Tobias W. Mock, The TSA's New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications
of "Body-Scan" Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
213, 238 (2009).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 238-39.
97. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); see also United States v.
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d. Cir.); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir.
2005).
98. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE

§

10.6 (4th ed. 2010) "[I]t is

generally assumed in the cases adopting the administrative search theory that nothing short of
screening all passengers will suffice." Id.
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scan captures the images of a passenger's body.
Under the test in Davis as modified for consent purposes by Aukai, it
is possible that the new technology is "more extensive" and "intensive
than necessary." 99 Such extensive exposure includes, "not only
concealed weapons, explosives, wallets, and coins but also rolls of fat,
the size of breasts and genitals, and catheter tubes." 00 Searches using
new technologies are permitted to detect weapons and explosives, but
those searches must be"confined in good faith to that purpose."' 0 '
Nevertheless, to what extent are the Backscatter and Millimeter
Wave scanners more invasive than the previous magnetometer
scanners? Proponents of heightened safety requirements would argue
that Backscatter and Millimeter Wave Technology is akin to the former
magnetometer scanners, which produced valid warrantless searches. 1 02
For example, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Epperson found that
requiring a warrant for magnetometers "would exalt form over
substance," as "[t]he danger is so well known, the governmental interest
so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so minimal, that the
warrant requirement is excused by exigent national circumstances." 0 3
However, organizations such as the ACLU have suggested that
current TSA scanners are significantly intrusive, so as to constitute a
"virtual strip search." 104 The concern is that passengers will be subject
to mandatory revealing searches, which expose detailed pictures of nude
passengers and their body parts. 0 5 Proponents of this theory contend
99. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at
913).
100. Sara Kornblatt, Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 385, 390 (2007) (citing Fred
Reed, Scanner Virtually Disrobes Passenger, WASH. TIMES, May 21, 2003, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/business/20030521-094809-8963r.htm; Am. Civil Liberties Union,
Airport Security: Increased Safety Need Not Come at the Expense of Civil Liberties (2002),
availableat http:// www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/1 6748res20020612.html)).
101. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962 (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
102. See generally Albarado, 495 F.2d at 799; Slocum, 474 F.2d at 1180; Epperson, 454
F.2d at 769.
103. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771.
104. M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken Rules: The Fourth Amendment Implications of FullBody Scanners in PreflightScreening, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 19 (2010) (citing ACLU Backgrounder
on Body Scanners and "Virtual Strip Searches," ACLU (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.acu.org/
technology-and-liberty/aclu-backgrounder-body-scanners-and-%E2%80%9Cvirtual-strip-searches%
E2%C80%9D; ACLU Urges Senate to Examine TSA's Privacy Violations in Post-9/11 Record, ACLU
(Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-securitylaclu-urges-senate-examine-tsaE2%C80%99sprivacy-violations-post-91 1-record; Tobias W. Mock, The Tsa's New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth
Amendment Implications of "Body-Scan" Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 229 (2009)); William Saletan, DigitalPenetration:Invasion of the Naked
Body-Scanners, Slate, Mar. 3, 2007, availableat http//www.slate.com/id/2160977/pagenum/all.
105. Mock, supra note 104, at 229 (citing Aviation Security: Hearing before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Timothy
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that the searches are violative of the Fourth Amendment, as images of a
passenger's body are not necessary for the constitutional search. It is
possible that these photographs could be passed on to internet sources,
exposing information that most passengers wish to keep private.1o
Although TSA regulations indicate that images are deleted as soon as
the passenger is cleared throu security, the deletion is dependent on
the actions of the TSA agent.IO
Yet, it is most likely that the new technology does not violate the
Fourth Amendment and will be found constitutional. Courts have held
that obscure "frisks" of every individual who sets off the magnetometer
for the first time is unreasonably intrusive, and should only be used in
"the last instance."' 0 8 Proponents of the new technology argue that
Backscatter and Millimeter Wave scanners are less intrusive than frisks,
D. Sparapani, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/24856leg20060404.html)).

Liberties

Union),

available at

The ACLU has outlined what they believe to be the principles of airline
security, which include (1) that new security technology must be genuinely
effective; (2) the level of privacy intrusion should reflect the level of risk; (3)
those technologies that reduce the gravest threats must be implemented first;
(4) technologies must focus on accomplishing the critical objective that
authorizes their application; (4) minimally intrusive screening technologies
should be implemented in lieu of ineffective passenger pre-screening proposals,
such as Secure Flight and Registered Traveler; and (5) Security measures
should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Sara Kornblatt, Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 385, 408 (2007) (citing
Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec. et al., Airline Passenger Security Screening: New
Technologies and Implementation Issues 1, 6 (1996)). "The ability to store images of passengers
until flights arrived safely at their destinations could generate invasion of privacy lawsuits." Id
See also M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken Rules: The Fourth Amendment Implications of
Full-Body Scanners in PreflightScreening, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 59 n.70 (2010); Kim Zetter,
Airport Scanners Can Store, Transmit Images, WIRED, Jan. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/airport-scanners/.
108. WAYNE R. LAFAVE 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 10.6 (4th ed. 2010) (citing Albarado, 495
F.2d at 799).
It by no means follows, however, that the screening authorities should
immediately proceed to frisk a person who has activated the magnetometer.
Such a procedure would deprive the hijacker detection system of a
characteristic which is essential to it being deemed a reasonable administrative
search, namely, that the intrusion be no more severe than is necessary to
produce "acceptable results."
Id.
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and may be implemented as an alternative.109 Moreover, the ACLU's
concerns have been obviated by a February 15, 2011 Senate vote,
making it a felony to distribute images obtained from body scanner
machines." 0 The bill serves to "prohibit anyone with access to the
scanned body images, whether security personnel or members of the
public, from photographing or disseminating those images.""'
Additionally, given the risks associated with airport security and the
frequency of airport attacks since September 11th, 2001, the Court will
likely find that a heightened level of search is warranted, akin to
Skipwith.112 Backscatter and Millimeter Wave scanners allow for
improved security measures because they are able to detect metal as
well as non-metal weapons and bombs. 1 3 As the Skipwith Court stated,
"When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions
of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large
airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness.
TSA is working with Backscatter and Millimeter Wave technology
and new software devices to limit the Advanced Imaging Technology
Instead of producing specific images of individuals
privacy issues.
scanned bodies, the new software displays images of generic figures,
highlighting threatening areas."16 Additionally, if no threat exists, the

109. Sara Kornblatt, Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 385, 408 (2007) (citing
Michael C. Murphy & Michael R. Wilds, X-Rated X-Ray Invades Privacy Rights, 12 CRIM.
JUST. POL'Y REV. 333, 338 (2001)).
110. Josiah Ryan, Senate Votes to Make It a Felony to Distribute Body Scan Images, THE
HILL, Feb. 15, 2011, available at http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/144183-senatevotes-to-make-distribution-of-airport-body-scan-images-a-felony. See also Joan Lowy, Senate:
Punish Misusers of Body Scanner Images, Bus. WK., Feb. 15, 2011, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LDBI501.htm. "The Senate has approved a
proposal to make the misuse of airport body scan images a crime punishable by up to a year in

prison and a $100,0000 fine." Id.
111. Joan Lowy, Senate: Punish Misusers of Body Scanner Images, Bus. WK., Feb. 15,
2011, availableat http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LDBI501.htm.
112. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.
113. Transportation Security Administration, Advanced Imaging Technology, How it
Works, available at http://www.tsa.gov/approach/techlait/how-it-works.shtm.
114. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.
115. TSA, Advanced Imaging Technology, How it Works, availableat http://www.tsa.gov/
approach/tech/ait/how it works.shtm.
116. Id.
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machine simply displays the words "ok" without any personal image.' 1 7
As the Second Circuit stated in United States v. Albarado, less intrusive
measures are preferred when possible.1 18 "Differences in equipment and
facilities may change the actual procedure, but the rule is easy to state:
exhaust the other efficient and available means, if any, by which to
discover the location and identity of the metal activating the
magnetometer before utilizing the frisk." 119
IX. CONCLUSION

On June 24, 2010, a bill was introduced into the Senate to propose
use of full-body scanners for screening purposes at airport security
checks throughout the nation. 120 In February 2011, TSA began testing
the software at some of its major metropolitan airports, such as Las
Vegas McCarran International Airport, Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta
International, and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. 121
Thus, it is likely that these scanners will be used in the future, and will
become as commonplace as magnetometers. 122 Backscatter and

Id. "'[C]loaking' software that turns the explicit images into something resembling a generic
chalk outline of the body, identifying plastic, ceramic, biological and other nonmetallic and
metallic objects on the body." Austin Considine, Will New Airport X-Rays Invade Privacy?,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2005, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/09/travel/09xray.html.
117. TSA, Advanced Imaging Technology, How it Works, availableat http://www.tsa.gov/
approach/tech/ait/how it works.shtm. Id.
118. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 808 (1974). "The public does have the expectation, or at least
under our Constitution the right to expect, that no matter the threat, the search to counter it will
be as limited as possible, consistent with meeting the threat." Id. at 806.
119. Id. at 808.
120. M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken Rules: The Fourth Amendment Implications of
Full-Body Scanners in Preflight Screening, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 59 (2010) (citing Securing
Aircraft From Explosives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging Recognition Act of 2010, S. 3536,
111th Cong. (2010)).
121. TSA, Advanced Imaging Technology, How it Works, available at
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/how it works.shtm; TSA Press Release, Feb. 1, 2011,
TSA Begins Testing New Advanced Imaging Technology Software, available at
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2011/0201.shtm.
122. Hudson Sangree, Scientists Race to Develop Airport Scannerfor Homeland Security,
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Millimeter Wave searches conducted under the Administrative Search
exception will likely be found constitutional, especially as terrorist
attacks on our nation's airports continue. As the level of danger
increases to a level on par with Skipwith, so does the government's
rationale. The felony distribution sentence will act as a deterrent to
those who attempt to distribute the images. With the scientific
improvements proposed by the TSA, intrusiveness of the search will
become a less persuasive argument in the face of potential security
threats.

GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2011, available at http://www.montrealgazette.com/travel
Scientists+race+develop+airport+scanner+Homeland+Security/4339013/story.html.
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